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WHEN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
VIOLATIONS ARISE UNDER THE LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 
Gwynne Skinner* 
INTRODUCTION 
ne question that the United States Supreme Court has yet to de-
cide is whether non-statutory, common law claims for violations 
of the law of nations, or customary international law,1 arise under the 
“laws of the United States” for purposes of both general federal question 
jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331)2 and Article III3 of the U.S. Constitution, 
the Article which sets the outer limits of federal judicial authority. A si-
milarly unanswered question is whether, even if such claims fall within 
federal jurisdiction, federal courts can recognize and provide remedies 
for such claims as a matter of their common law power; in other words, 
whether a federal court can entertain a claim that is not based on a statu-
tory cause of action. These questions are inextricably intertwined with 
another largely unsettled issue: the precise role of customary internation-
al law in our domestic legal system and, in particular, its specific status 
as federal common law. Scholars continue to debate whether federal 
                                                                                                             
 *  Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law. M.St. (LL.M. equiva-
lent) International Human Rights Law, Oxford University, with Distinction; J.D. Univer-
sity of Iowa, with High Distinction; M.A., American Studies, University of Iowa; B.A., 
Political Science, University of Northern Iowa, Highest Honors. 
 1. The terms “law of nations” and “customary international law” are used interchan-
geably in this Article. The “law of nations” is generally equated with customary interna-
tional law. The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 298, 307–08 (1819) (referring to non-treaty-
based law of nations as the “the customary . . . law of nations”); see also Flores v. South-
ern Peru Copper Corp.,414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2010) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
 3. Article III of the United States Constitution sets forth the outer limits of federal 
judicial power. Section 1 provides, in relevant part: “The Judicial Power of the United 
States shall be vested in one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (Federal judicial 
power shall extend to nine different categories, including: 1) to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority; 2) all cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls; 3) to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; 4) to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; 5) to Controversies between 
two or more States; 6) between a State and Citizen of another State; 7) between Citizens 
of different States; 8) between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States; and 9) between a State or Citizens thereof and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.). 
O 
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courts have the authority to incorporate customary international law as 
part of federal common law wholly, partially, piece-meal, or not at all. 
This Article concludes that common law claims for violations of cus-
tomary international law arise under the “laws of the United States” for § 
1331 general federal question jurisdiction and within Article III, but only 
where such claims or defenses implicate uniquely federal interests, such 
as foreign relations. This position is not taken because the law of nations 
is, or historically has been, part of the “laws of the United States” for 
Article III and § 1331 purposes. On the contrary, the law of nations 
probably was not considered to be the “law of the United States” per se 
when Article III and § 1331 each were enacted.4 Rather, this position is 
taken for two reasons. First, certain enclaves of federal common law 
have developed over time to include certain norms and rules of customa-
ry international law, and federal courts have the judicial authority to con-
tinue to develop such law when uniquely national interests are at stake. 
This remains true even after Erie v. Tompkins.5 Second, federal common 
law has evolved to become “law of the United States” for purposes of 
both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
Thus, it is not customary international law per se that is law of the 
United States for purposes of Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Rather, it 
is federal common law, which incorporates some aspects of customary 
international law, that is considered “law of the United States” for pur-
poses of Article III and § 1331. This is an important distinction because 
federal common law is now arguably “law of the United States” as con-
templated by Article III and § 1331, whereas customary international law 
is not. Hence, claims alleging violations of customary international law 
that affect uniquely federal interests are properly characterized as federal 
common law claims, giving rise to federal question jurisdiction under 
current Supreme Court precedent of Milwaukee v. Illinois6 and Romero 
v. International Terminal Operating Co.7 
Additionally, this Article maintains that federal courts have the com-
mon law power to recognize and thus provide remedies for customary 
                                                                                                             
 4. That the law of nations per se was not considered to be the law of the United 
States for Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 purposes at the time each was enacted does 
not provide an answer regarding whether the federal courts have the power to incorporate 
aspects of customary international law into federal common law, or to use their federal 
common law power to recognize tort claims for customary international law violations, 
where such claims affect uniquely federal interests. 
 5. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts did not 
have the judicial power to create general federal common law when adjudicating state 
law claims under diversity jurisdiction). 
 6. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
 7. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). 
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international law violations where the same uniquely federal interests are 
involved, notwithstanding the lack of a statutory basis for such claims. 
This is because Congress implicitly authorized such private claims due to 
its understanding when it enacted § 1331 that federal courts would use 
their common law powers to provide remedies for federal common law 
claims. Though the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism regarding 
whether federal courts have jurisdiction over customary international law 
claims under § 1331 analogous to that provided by the Alien Tort Sta-
tute, this Article concludes that the Court’s skepticism most likely relates 
to concerns about federal courts using their common law powers too 
broadly, thereby recognizing claims in a vast array of areas unrelated to 
uniquely federal interests or with regard to actions Congress never in-
tended or understood when it enacted § 1331. Such broad and unintended 
use of federal common law powers would likely not be consistent with 
Erie. However, use of common law power to recognize and provide re-
medies only for those claims of customary international law violations 
that entail uniquely federal areas arguably would be consistent with Erie. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the current debate regard-
ing the role of customary international law within federal common law 
and whether customary international law is “Law of the United States” 
for purposes of Article III. This overview helps set the stage for the re-
mainder of the Article. Part II of this Article addresses the unanswered 
question of whether claims for violation of customary international law 
“arise under” the Constitution or “laws” of the United States for purposes 
of Article III and § 1331. It concludes that Congress probably did not 
consider the law of nations per se to be law of the United States. Howev-
er, federal common law, which did not exist when Article III was drafted 
and was only in its infancy when § 1331 was enacted in 1875, later de-
veloped to include aspects of customary international law. 
Part III of this Article addresses a related, but ultimately distinct ques-
tion regarding the common law power of federal courts to recognize pri-
vate causes of action for customary international law violations consis-
tent with the Erie decision.8 It also addresses the Supreme Court’s skep-
ticism articulated in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,9 regarding whether federal 
courts are authorized to recognize claims for customary international law 
                                                                                                             
 8. This issue overlaps and is intertwined with the issue addressed infra Part II. As 
such, it is difficult to address each issue separately. However, whether a court has juris-
diction over such causes of action is ultimately a separate, albeit intertwined, question 
from whether a court has the power to recognize the claim and provide a remedy absent 
statutory authorization. 
 9. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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violations under § 1331 in the same manner as they would under the 
Alien Tort Statute.10 
I. THE CURRENT DEBATE 
Although near consensus has emerged in the lower federal courts that 
customary international law is “part of the federal common law,”11 scho-
lars disagree about its precise role in the U.S. legal system. In addition, 
although the Supreme Court in Sosa may have agreed with the proposi-
tion that certain customary international law norms are actionable 
through federal common law claims, it did not specify its views regard-
ing the contours of customary international law in our federal judicial 
system. The Court indicated only that “domestic law of the United States 
recognizes the law of nations.”12 
A. Role of Customary International Law within Federal Common Law 
Two predominant schools of thought have emerged regarding the role 
of customary international law within the domestic law of the United 
States: those who advocate the so-called “modern” position, and those 
who support the so-called “revisionist” position. Although there are 
slight differences among the modernist scholars’ positions, their general 
view is that federal law incorporates customary international law.13 Most 
modernists agree with the revisionists that customary international law 
was considered general common law early in this country’s history (the 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. at 731 n.19 (holding that although the federal courts could use their common 
law power to recognize aliens’ tort claims for a limited set of violations of the “law of 
nations” under the jurisdictional Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), “a more expansive common 
law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331” might not be consistent with the division of re-
sponsibilities between state and federal courts after Erie v. Tompkins). 
 11. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Estate of 
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992); Igartúa-De 
La Rosa v. United States 417 F.3d 145, 177–79 (1stCir. 2005). In addition, “customary 
international law is considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is fed-
eral law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 111 cmt. d (1987). 
 12. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added). 
 13. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Inter-
national Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295 (1994); see also William Casto, The New 
Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS 
L.J. 635 (2006); William Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. 
Legal System after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA  J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87 (2004) 
[hereinafter Dodge, Bridging Erie]; Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm 
Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
463, 472 (1997); Harold Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 1824, 1825 (1998); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International 
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 435–36 (1997). 
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concept of federal common law did not exist at the time).14 However, 
modernists argue that federal common law later developed and came to 
incorporate customary international law, emerging as a clear enclave of 
federal common law after the Erie decision.15 They do not believe that 
Congress has to explicitly authorize the federal courts to incorporate cus-
tomary international law into federal law because federal courts already 
have the common law power to do so.16 
The revisionists argue that federal common law has never incorporated 
customary international law.17 They further claim that after Erie, custo-
mary international law can only become part of federal common law 
when Congress specifically authorizes its incorporation.18 The revision-
ists assert that the law of nations was historically part of the general 
common law, but unlike the modernists, they do not believe that the law 
of nations ever became part of federal common law.19 To the degree that 
it did, they argue that the Erie decision ended the ability of federal courts 
to incorporate customary international law without explicit congressional 
authorization.20 
After the Sosa decision, two of the best known revisionists, Professors 
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, along with Professor David Moore, 
wrote an article in the Harvard Law Review, arguing that the Supreme 
Court in Sosa agreed with the revisionists’ views.21 This was evidenced, 
they argued, by the Court’s holding that either the legislative or the ex-
ecutive branch must authorize federal courts to apply customary interna-
tional law before the courts can do so and that the Alien Tort Statute 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 13; Stephens, supra note 13. 
 15. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 13, at 471–72; Stephens, supra note 13, at 
436. 
 16. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 13, at 471–72; Stephens, supra note 13, at 436. 
 17. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 
(1997) [hereinafter Bradley &Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. 
Courts—Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 807 (1998) [hereinafter 
Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts]. 
 18. See Bradley &Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law, supra note 17, at 817–20. 
 19. Id. at 823. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary Inter-
national Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie,120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873, 894 
(2007) [hereinafter Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, 
and the Continuing Relevance of Erie]. 
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(“ATS”)22 provides the requisite authorization, albeit on a limited basis.23 
Other scholars have been very critical of this position, claiming that Sosa 
held the opposite: that courts do not need explicit authorization to apply 
customary international law when adjudicating cases before them.24 
B. Whether Customary International Law is Part of the Laws of United 
States Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
The revisionists argue that the framers did not intend Article III to in-
clude the law of nations, claiming that the law of nations was part of the 
general common law and not part of the “Laws of the United States” for 
purposes of Article III.25 Moreover, the revisionists emphasize the omis-
sion of the phrase “law of nations” from Article III.26 They compare this 
to the inclusion of the phrase in Article I, which states that Congress has 
the power to “define and punish . . . [o]ffences against the Law of Na-
tions.”27 The revisionists argue that this inclusion in Article I demon-
strates that the framers did not intend the law of nations to be within the 
purview Article III.28 They further note that Article III extends the feder-
al judicial power to treaties and that Article VI declares treaties to be the 
supreme law of the land, though neither mentions the law of nations.29 
Finally, they point out that an early draft of Article III would have ex-
                                                                                                             
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010) (stating that federal district courts have jurisdiction over 
tort claims brought by aliens for violations of the law of nations). 
 23. Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Con-
tinuing Relevance of Erie, supra note 21. 
 24. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Sosa, the Federal Common Law and Customary Interna-
tional Law, Reaffirming the Federal Courts’ Power, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 269 
(2007). In my view, the modernists are correct. The Court made it clear that no specific 
authorization was required for federal courts to incorporate certain aspects of customary 
international law as federal common law. Instead, the Court suggested that the necessary 
element was the authorization, albeit implicit, for plaintiffs to be able to seek a remedy. 
Such implicit authorization can be granted through Congress’s understanding that upon 
enactment of a jurisdictional statute, courts will use their common law power to recog-
nize a claim and provide a remedy. See discussion infra Part III, pp. 37–39. 
 25. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law, supra note 17, at 823, 824; Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, Sosa, Customary 
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, supra note 21, at 875; Bradley, 
The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note 17, at 812. 
 26. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law, 
supra note 17, at 824–27. 
 27. Id. at 819–20; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 28. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law, supra note 17, at 819. 
 29. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note 
17, at 820. 
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tended federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under the “Law of Na-
tions,” but that the reference was deleted (although without any apparent 
explanation).30 
The debate concerning whether customary international law is part of 
the “Laws of the United States” under Article III also arises in the con-
text of the constitutionality of the ATS when the defendant is an alien.31 
Revisionists, such as Professor Bradley, argue that claims for violations 
of the law of nations under the ATS do not fall under Article III’s “aris-
ing under” provision, but rather are encompassed under Article III’s alie-
nage jurisdiction.32 This would mean that claims brought by an alien un-
der the ATS against another alien would not be constitutional under Ar-
ticle III. Bradley argues that Congress either mistakenly believed that 
Article III’s alienage provision extended to any suit involving aliens even 
where both parties were aliens, or Congress intended to limit suits to 
those where the defendant was a U.S. citizen.33 Although Bradley sets 
forth evidence that supports both possibilities, he favors the latter.34  
Modernists take the opposite position, agreeing with the Second Cir-
cuit in the ground-breaking ATS case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,35 which 
held that claims for violation of the law of nations brought pursuant to 
the ATS arise under the “Laws of the United States” for purposes of Ar-
ticle III jurisdiction.36 Professor William Dodge cites numerous docu-
ments and certain federalist papers in arguing that, at the time Article III 
was drafted, Congress viewed the law of nations as “Law of the United 
States” for purposes of Article III, albeit not through what we now rec-
ognize as federal common law.37 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 820 n.82 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 157 
(Max Farrand ed. 1911) (other internal citations omitted). 
 31. Claims brought pursuant to the ATS by an alien against a citizen would be consti-
tutional under Article III given the alienage jurisdiction of Article III. 
 32. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 
590–92 (2002) [hereinafter Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III]; see also Tho-
mas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 
835–40 (2006). 
 33. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statue and Article III, supra note 32, at 590–92. 
 34. Id. at 627–28. 
 35. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 36. See, e.g., Dodge, Bridging Erie, supra note 13, at 102; Goodman & Jinks, supra 
note 13, at 475; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. 
L. REV. 1555, 1559–60 (1984). 
 37. William Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observa-
tions on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 705–08 (2002) [hereinafter Dodge, The 
Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute]. 
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Professor Dodge also emphasizes the language difference between Ar-
ticle III and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, noting that the latter 
refers to “This Constitution, and Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof,” whereas the former only discusses “Laws 
of the United States” without reference to “in pursuance thereof.”38 In 
addition, Professor Dodge argues that Congress deliberately struck the 
words “passed by the Legislature” from the text of Article III.39 Given 
this, he suggests that there must be a category of laws that are not made 
by Congress “pursuant” to the Constitution and yet are “Laws of the 
United States.”40 The most obvious candidate, he suggests, is the law of 
nations.41 Another leading scholar opines that the framers and early jur-
ists believed that “all of the common law pertinent to the enforcement of 
the law of nations naturally attached to the federal government upon its 
creation.”42 Thus, the modernists clearly disagree with the revisionists 
about whether federal jurisdiction over claims for customary internation-
al law violations is consistent with Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 
The debate continues with no clear consensus on the horizon. 
II. WHETHER COMMON LAW CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISE UNDER LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 
PURPOSES OF ARTICLE III AND 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
A. Whether the Founders Considered the Law of Nations to be Law of the 
United States Under Article III 
As described above, one major area of disagreement among scholars is 
whether members of the Constitutional Convention intended the “Laws 
of the United States” under Article III to include the law of nations. To 
be sure, compelling evidence exists to support both sides of this debate, 
suggesting there is no clear answer to this question.43 While there is sig-
nificant evidence to support the contention that the founders viewed the 
law of nations as “Laws of the United States,” a close look at judicial 
opinions and other historical material reveals that Congress probably did 
not consider the law of nations per se to be law of the United States 
when it drafted Article III. 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. at 704. 
 39. Dodge, Bridging Erie, supra note 13, at 102. 
 40. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, supra note 37, at 705. 
 41. Id. 
 42. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 160 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC]. 
 43. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
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1. Evidence Supporting the Contention that the Founders Viewed the 
Laws of Nations as “Laws of the United States” 
Early prosecutions of federal common law crimes demonstrate that 
many of the framers viewed the law of nations as part of the common 
law of the United States and, in fact, exclusive to the federal judiciary. 
From the late 1700’s until the early 1800’s, the federal government pros-
ecuted citizens for violations of the law of nations, such as piracy, crimes 
on the high seas, breaches of neutrality, and attacks on diplomats under 
the common law of the United States.44 In these cases, courts routinely 
stated that the law of nations was part of the law of the United States.45 
These prosecutions came to an end in 181246 amidst increasing criticism 
of the idea that certain federal common law crimes existed that were not 
codified under a statute.47 The criticisms, however, were largely based on 
the concern that federal jurisdiction over federal common law crimes 
provided Congress with unlimited power over the states.48 That federal 
law encompassed the law of nations was not the concern.49 
Three Attorney General Opinions issued in the 1800’s, all of which 
stated that the law of nations is part of the law of the United States, fur-
ther support the proposition that the framers and early jurists viewed the 
law of nations as part of the law of the United States.50 Moreover, federal 
courts throughout the 1800’s applied the law of nations when adjudicat-
                                                                                                             
 44. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 136–38; 
see, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa 1793) (No. 6360). 
 45. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 131; Hen-
field’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1117 (because the law of nations is part of the common law of 
the United States, Henfield and others like him are subject to common law prosecution in 
federal court). 
 46. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). 
 47. See, e.g., id. (“Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of 
justice from the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is 
not among those powers.”). 
 48. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 135, 149–
50, 160. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 566, 570–71 (1822) (stating that the law of nations is part of 
“the laws of the country” and “our laws”); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 495, 503 (1855) (“The laws 
of the United States [include] the Constitution, treaties, acts of Congress . . . and the law 
of nations, public and private, as administered by the Supreme Court, and Circuit and 
District Courts of the United States . . . .”); 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) (“That the 
laws of the nations constitute a part of the laws of the land is established from the face of 
the Constitution, upon principle and authority.”). 
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ing civil cases,51 often stating that the law of nations is “part of the law of 
the United States.”52 For example, the Supreme Court in the 1815 case of 
The Nereide states, “[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is 
part of the law of the land.”53 In 1855, the Court in Jecker, Torre & Co. 
v. Montgomery, in deriving a rule from the law of nations in a prize case, 
also reinforces the view that the law of nations is part of the law of the 
United States.54 
Perhaps the most famous case discussing the law of nations as part of 
“our law,” is the 1899 case of The Paquete Habana, which states, “Inter-
national Law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as ques-
tions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determina-
tion.”55 These cases, along with the three Attorney General Opinions, 
provide evidence that many jurists throughout the 1800’s believed that 
the law of nations was part of the law of the United States. 
2. The Law of Nations, Per Se, was Likely Not Considered Part of the 
Laws of the United States When the Framers Drafted Article III 
a. The Law of Nations was Perceived as a Transcendent Body of Law, 
Applied by Both Federal and State Courts When They Otherwise had 
Jurisdiction 
The case decisions and opinions referenced above, however, do not 
confirm that the framers believed that the law of nations was law of the 
United States, especially with respect to Article III’s jurisdiction provi-
sion. Most of the aforementioned decisions and opinions are too far re-
moved temporally to provide much insight about whether the framers 
specifically intended Article III’s “Laws of the United States” to include 
the law of nations, and the judicial opinions arise in cases where the 
Court otherwise had jurisdiction on different Article III grounds, such as 
admiralty. Moreover, none of the judicial opinions specifically address 
Article III’s reference to the “Laws of the United States” with respect to 
the law of nations. In fact, the first case that specifically addressed 
whether the “law of nations” arises under Article III’s “Laws of the Unit-
                                                                                                             
 51. For a list of such cases, see Gwynne Skinner, Federal Jurisdiction over U.S. Citi-
zens’ Claims for Violations of the Law of Nations in Light of Sosa, 37 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 53, 102–07 (2008). 
 52. Id. 
 53. The Neriede, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). 
 54. Jecker, Torre & Co. v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855). 
 55. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). 
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ed States” did not occur until 1871,56 and involved the Supreme Court’s 
appellate review (given that general federal question jurisdiction was not 
yet enacted).57 Rather, these statements likely reflected the courts’ views 
that the law of nations was a transcendent body of law (i.e., a type of 
general common law) that all courts, federal and state, could apply. 
For example, when the federal courts already had jurisdiction on some 
other basis, such as admiralty, they applied the law of nations without 
any specific authority from Congress.58 Similarly, state courts throughout 
the 1800’s applied certain aspects of the law of nations to cases before 
them, typically tort cases that arose out of war.59 In addition, an 1802 
Attorney General Opinion (issued prior to the afore mentioned Attorney 
General Opinions supporting the position that the law of nations was 
seen as federal law) stated that a violation against the “law of nations” 
did not contravene any “provision in the Constitution [or] any law of the 
United States,” and that the “the law of nations is considered as part of 
                                                                                                             
 56. See Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. 216 (1871); see also discussion infra pp. 24–26. 
 57. General federal question jurisdiction was not enacted until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 
1875, Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
 58. See Skinner, supra note 51, at 57–58; see also Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 
Wall.) 1, 7–12 (1868) (where the Supreme Court applied the law of war, which it de-
scribed as fitting within general principles of law, in holding that a contract for the pay-
ment of money in Confederate currency was valid because the contract at issue was used 
in the regular course of business and the currency was imposed on the community “by 
such irresistible force that the use of them had no purpose in furthering or aiding the re-
bellion.”); Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 449 (1872) (although referring 
to the law of war, the Court again applied principles of what it called “public law” in 
finding that a bond issued by the state of Arkansas used to fund the insurgency could not 
be consideration as a matter of public policy); Dainese v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 64 
(1879) (where the Court of Claims applied the law of nations to determine that a consul 
had judicial responsibilities, and thus was entitled to additional pay); United States v. 
One Thousand Five Hundred Bales of Cotton, 27 F. Cas. 325 (C.C. Tenn. 1872) (the 
Circuit Court applied the law of war to determine whether the proceeds from the sale of 
cotton used to aid the rebellion should be forfeited); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 
U.S. 649, 655–94 (1898) (applying international law to settle a question of immigra-
tion);Willamette Iron-Bridge Co. v. Hatch,125 U.S. 1, 15 (1888) (where the Supreme 
Court did not apply international law per se, but noted that once a federal court has juris-
diction over the issue of whether states can erect bridges that obstruct waterways, it can 
apply international law. The Court cited The Wheeling Bridge Case, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 
518 (1851), as an example where international law was applied. In addition, the Court 
distinguished between common law of the United States and international law, as sepa-
rate rules of decisions or bodies of law to be applied.); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 
185–90 (1877) (applying the laws of war extensively in holding that the Confederacy’s 
sequestering of a Pennsylvania citizen’s debts as alien enemy was void under the Consti-
tution). 
 59. See Skinner, supra note 51, at 107–09. 
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the municipal law of each State.”60 The state court opinions, applying the 
law of nations and the 1802 Attorney General Opinion, support the view 
that the law of nations was simply part of the general common law, ap-
plied by courts in appropriate circumstances when they otherwise had 
jurisdiction. 
Thus, as Professors Bradley and Goldstein have stated, the assertions 
about the law of nations being part of the law of the land was “likely 
nothing more than a mimicking of earlier statements by Blackstone,” and 
are “perfectly consistent with the law of nations’ status as general com-
mon law.”61 
b. In Article III, the Framers Provided for Federal Jurisdiction Over 
Specific Types of Cases That Would Implicate Foreign Affairs, not 
Wholesale Jurisdiction Over the Law of Nations 
i. The Framers Agreed to Constitutional Limitations on Federal Jurisdic-
tion 
A close examination of the debate concerning federal jurisdiction that 
took place during the Constitutional Convention, combined with the 
omission of any reference to the “law of nations” in the final draft of Ar-
ticle III, suggests that the framers intended to provide federal jurisdiction 
over only those specific areas that they believed implicated federal inter-
ests, such as foreign relations. This decision was likely a product of the 
ongoing debate concerning the limits of federal power generally, as well 
as the limits of federal judicial power. Because the law of nations was 
perceived as transcendent, giving the federal judiciary jurisdiction over 
all cases involving the law of nations was likely viewed as an invasion of 
the states’ rights. 
The drafting of the Constitution, as one might expect, was subject to 
controversy regarding the role of the federal government, including the 
federal judiciary. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the founding 
generation was contemplating both the constitutional and initial statutory 
scope of a federal judiciary.62 One of the most significant issues was the 
extent of the national courts’ constitutional authority to adjudicate cas-
                                                                                                             
 60. 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 691, 692 (1802). 
 61. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law, 
supra note 17, at 850, 850 n.227 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 67 (1769) (stating that the “law of nations . . . is held to be a part of 
the law of the land”)). 
 62. See, e.g., CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42; 
HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (2d 
ed. 1984). 
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es—in one word, jurisdiction.63 Some opposed a strong central govern-
ment and thus opposed a strong federal judiciary.64 Others wanted a 
strong central government and a strong federal judiciary, which they be-
lieved would not only offset tendencies toward “balkanization” of the 
states, but would guarantee that national interests would be protected and 
advanced.65 
One of the major points of disagreement at the Constitutional Conven-
tion was whether inferior federal courts should exist and limits on their 
jurisdictional scope.66 Some framers believed that it was unnecessary and 
undesirable to have lower federal courts, arguing that as long as state 
courts were subject to appellate review by the Supreme Court, the inter-
ests of the national government would be protected.67 Others, however, 
distrusted the “ability and willingness of the state courts to uphold feder-
al law,” especially where there might be conflicting state and federal in-
terests.68 They did not believe that the Supreme Court’s review of certain 
state court decisions would be adequate because they feared the number 
of such appeals would exceed the Court’s limited capacity to hear and 
adjudicate each case.69 
After much debate, the framers reached a compromise with Article III 
of the Constitution mandating the existence of the Supreme Court, out-
lining its original and appellate jurisdiction, and defining the outer limits 
of the federal judiciary’s subject matter jurisdiction.70 Congress could 
then later determine whether inferior courts would exist and the scope of 
their jurisdiction through enactment of statutes.71 As part of the compro-
mise, the drafters also agreed to refrain from conferring the full extent of 
Article III jurisdiction—whatever that would be—to federal courts in 
their planned First Judiciary Act.72 
In outlining the constitutional limits on jurisdiction set forth in Article 
III, the drafters considered a variety of arrangements that would preserve 
local power and protect national interests.73 All of the drafters, even 
those supporting limited federal power, sought to ensure that foreign af-
fairs and national security issues were placed within the powers of the 
                                                                                                             
 63. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 5. 
 64. See FINK & TUSHNET, supra note 62, at 5. 
 65. Id. 
 66. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 3 (3d ed. 1999). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 25–26. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 12–15. 
 73. FINK & TUSHNET, supra note 62, at 3. 
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federal government.74 Thus, each of the draft judiciary plans, although 
significantly different in other areas, demonstrated a consensus to grant 
federal jurisdiction over cases involving foreign relations, which in-
cluded admiralty,75 prize cases,76 and cases involving aliens.77 
After the Convention passed a resolution stating, inter alia, that “the 
jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under 
the laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions 
as involve National peace and harmony,”78 a five-person committee 
worked out a compromise and drafted Article III.79 The resulting draft of 
Article III created the Supreme Court and outlined nine different catego-
ries of cases that future federal courts could ultimately have jurisdiction 
over: 
1) to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority; 2) all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls; 3) to all cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction; 4) to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; 
5) to Controversies between two or more States; 6) between a State and 
Citizen of another State; 7) between Citizens of different States; 8) be-
tween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of dif-
ferent States; and 9) between a State or Citizens thereof and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects.80 
The compromise also granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction 
over cases affecting diplomats as well as appellate jurisdiction over each 
of the nine types of cases outlined in Article III.81 Of course, these were 
the outer Constitutional limits, and Congress still needed to authorize 
federal jurisdiction through statutory enactments. 
                                                                                                             
 74. See id. at 3, 6–7; CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra 
note 42, at 6; Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1231, 1267–68, 1275 (1985). 
 75. See FINK &TUSHNET, supra note 62, at 6–7; see also CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT 
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 7. 
 76. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 7. Prize 
cases involved a court’s condemnation of property seized from commercial enemy ves-
sels during time of war, and the court’s decision about whether such seizure was lawful. 
It was an important area of international law in the 18th century that was seen as impli-
cating national security concerns. 
 77. Id. 
 78. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 14 (em-
phasis added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 81. Id. 
2010] CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. 219 
ii. Pursuant to the Compromise, the First Judiciary Act of 1789 Provided 
Lower Federal Courts with Jurisdiction Over Specific Types of Cases 
that Could Affect Foreign Affairs 
The resulting Judiciary Act of 1789,82 while reflecting the agreed-upon 
limits on federal jurisdiction, ensured that the federal judiciary would 
have jurisdiction over every type of case likely to impact foreign rela-
tions.83 For example, the Judiciary Act reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction over suits involving diplomats.84 With regard to the 
lower federal courts, Congress created alienage jurisdiction for claims 
over $500,85 provided exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases involving 
admiralty and maritime matters,86 and provided concurrent jurisdiction 
for cases in which aliens bring tort claims in violation of the law of na-
tions.87 The framers believed that it was critical to ensure federal juris-
diction over aliens’ claims for torts in violation of the law of nations—
which at the time likely included piracy, attacks on diplomats, and safe 
                                                                                                             
 82. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1257 (West 2010)). 
 83. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 27–31; 
see also Jay, supra note 74, at 1275. 
 84. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80–81. 
 85. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. at 78–79 (The Act allowed for the 
removal of cases against an alien defendant for claims in excess of $500 from state to 
federal court. The $500 requirement for claims involving aliens was, like nearly every-
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debt collections under the Treaty of Paris. By limiting jurisdiction over cases involving 
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courts, which were much more sympathetic to U.S. citizens); CASTO, THE SUPREME 
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party to be a citizen. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 
(1809); Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 
U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 13–14 (1800). This section of the First Judiciary Act was soon deemed 
unconstitutional because it did not comport with Article III provisions. It has never been 
determined how and why Congress created this apparent inconsistency. See also Bradley, 
The Alien Tort Statue and Article III., supra note 32, at 590–91 (suggesting that this in-
consistency was likely a legislative oversight). 
 86. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76–77 (for a variety of reasons, admi-
ralty jurisdiction in particular was an area over which there was little controversy because 
of the need for federal courts to have jurisdiction over prize cases); CASTO, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 42, at 40. 
 87. Id. (now referred to as the Alien Tort Statute). 
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passage88—because those types of violations potentially “threatened se-
rious consequences in international affairs.”89 
However, the founders did not include within federal jurisdiction—
either within Article III or the First Judiciary Act—claims alleging gen-
eral violation of the law of nations. As mentioned above, the law of na-
tions had been included in earlier drafts of Article III, but it was ultimate-
ly removed without an explanation.90 
c. The Federalist Papers Indicate That the “Laws of the United States” 
Likely Did Not Include the Law of Nations 
Another important source in determining the framers’ intent are the 
Federalist Papers—a series of 85 articles and essays likely written by 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocating the rati-
fication of the new Constitution and outlining its philosophy and inter-
pretation.91 In the Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton, discussing 
federal jurisdiction, outlines six areas to which the judicial authority of 
the Union ought to extend: 
[First], to all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, 
passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legisla-
tion; [second], to all those which concern the execution of the provi-
sions expressly contained in the articles of the Union; [third], to all 
those in which the Unites States are a party; [and fourth], to all those 
which involve the Peace of the Confederacy, whether they relate to the 
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that be-
tween the States themselves; [fifth], to all those which originate on the 
high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; [and] lastly, to 
all those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial 
and unbiased.92 
After discussing each area in turn, Hamilton examines the draft Consti-
tution, in particular Article III, arguing how each provision of the draft 
Constitution fits into the six areas outlined.93 First, he addresses the pro-
vision, “To all cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and 
                                                                                                             
 88. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714–15 (2004) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
 89. Id. at 715. 
 90. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, supra note 
17, at 820 n.82. 
 91. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1–85 (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madi-
son), reprinted in A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Edward 
Mead ed., Random House 1937) [hereinafter FEDERALIST PAPERS]. 
 92. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id., at 520–22. 
 93. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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the laws of the United States.”94 Hamilton states that this clause responds 
to the “two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as prop-
er for the jurisdiction of the United States.”95 He was clearly referring to 
the first two of the six areas that he outlined at the beginning of his pa-
per. The first involves “all those which arise out of the laws of the United 
States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of 
legislation . . . .”96 Thus, he was clearly referring to laws enacted by 
Congress, and not to a more broad conception of “law” that would in-
clude the law of nations. 
It is also important to note that Hamilton did not find that the “laws of 
the United States” clause of Article III satisfied the fourth type of cas-
es—those involving “the peace of the confederacy, whether they relate to 
the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations . . . .”97 
Had he concluded the opposite, a much stronger argument could be made 
that “law of the United States” was intended to include the law of na-
tions. Rather, it was the provisions regarding all cases involving foreign-
ers, as well as the cases involving treaties, that he believed satisfied the 
“keeping the peace” class of cases.98 While the Federalist Papers clearly 
advocate that the federal judiciary should have jurisdiction over cases 
that might affect foreign affairs,99 nowhere do the Federalist Papers sug-
gest that Article III’s “Laws of the United States” language was intended 
to include, or viewed as including, the law of nations.100 
Taking into consideration Federalist No. 80, the final wording of Ar-
ticle III, the extensive areas in which the framers did ensure federal ju-
risdiction, and the predominant view that the law of nations was similar 
to the general common law which both federal and state courts applied, it 
is more likely than not that that the framers did not intend that the “Laws 
of the United States” provision of Article III would include the law of 
nations. It is unlikely that the framers intended to provide for federal ju-
risdiction over any and all claims involving the law of nations, especially 
where national interests would not be implicated by such claims. This is 
also consistent with the framers’ desire to limit federal judicial power. 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
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 100. See, e.g., FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 91. Notwithstanding the above, it is 
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B. Whether Congress Considered the Law of Nations, Per Se, to be Law 
of the United States for Purposes of General Federal Question Jurisdic-
tion 
It is equally unclear whether Congress intended general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to include all cases involving the law of nations. There is 
little legislative history regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and virtually no in-
formation about what types of claims Congress believed would arise 
“under the laws of the United States,” let alone whether the “laws of the 
United States” would include the law of nations or even federal common 
law.101 It does seem clear, however, that the manager of the bill estab-
lishing federal question jurisdiction and its likely author, Senator Ma-
thew Carpenter,102 intended for § 1331 jurisdiction be the same as Article 
III’s jurisdiction provision.103 He declared, “The [Judiciary] [A]ct of 
1789 did not confer the whole [judicial] power which the Constitution 
conferred . . . . This bill does . . . [t]he bill gives precisely the power 
which the Constitution confers—nothing more and nothing less.”104 He 
also stated that “[t]he present bill is intended to confer a jurisdiction just 
as it is conferred in the Constitution, without that limitation.”105 
There is no evidence that Senator Carpenter believed that Article III’s 
provisions per se included the law of nations. Moreover, it is improbable 
that he believed that the framers intended Article III to include “federal 
common law,” given that federal common law did not exist at the time 
that the Constitution was written. But, as discussed in the next Section of 
this Article, federal common law began to develop in the latter half of the 
1800’s. As such, he and others in Congress probably understood the 
“arising under” provision of § 1331 to include claims involving certain 
aspects of the common law that implicated federal interests, such as for-
eign relations. 
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C. Federal Common Law Now Includes Claims Involving the Law of Na-
tions Where Such Claims Implicate Federal Interests 
There is agreement among scholars on both sides of the debate that in 
the late 1700’s and throughout most of the early 1800’s, the law of na-
tions was considered to be general common law, applied by both federal 
and state courts.106 The concept of federal common law that we recog-
nize today began to emerge in the late 1800’s.107 
1. Development of Federal Common Law in the Late 1800’s 
Federal courts began developing their own common law in the 1800’s, 
during the time that Swift v. Tyson108 was decided in 1842.109 The devel-
opment of federal common law took place not only in areas of obvious 
national interest,110 such as admiralty,111 but also in areas typically asso-
ciated with state interests, such as contracts, agency, insurance, and 
torts.112 As some scholars have noted, the motivation behind recognizing 
and developing this type of federal common law was largely economic, 
with a desire to create uniform national law to help facilitate commercial 
transactions.113 
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 113. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 309. 
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Notwithstanding the development of common law by the federal courts 
in these various areas, the Supreme Court stated on numerous occasions 
throughout the 1800’s that there was no common law of the United 
States.114 However, it seems clear that those cases stand for the notion 
that the common law of England was not inherited by the federal gov-
ernment in the same way that it was inherited by each of the states. For 
example, in the 1798 case U.S. v. Worrall, the Supreme Court notes that 
the common law of England can be traced to the states but not to the 
United States as a national government.115 The Court continues, “The 
common law of England is the law of each State, [in] so far as each state 
has adopted it.”116 The Court further explains in the 1834 case Wheaton 
v. Peters that when English citizens came to the U.S., they brought with 
them the English common law and while each state adopted English 
common law as it saw fit, the federal government did not.117 
These cases indicate that the common law referred to in the opinions 
was the already-established common law of England. These opinions did 
not address whether the federal courts had power to develop common 
law in areas unique to the federal government. In fact, federal courts be-
lieved that they had the power to create their own common law to aid in 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes118 as well as other 
areas including commercial and immigration law.119 
Despite the continued development of common law by federal courts, 
many criticized the Swift decision and its progeny. This criticism reflect-
ed a tension between the rights of state courts to develop and apply their 
own common law in matters of local concern and the recognition that 
certain types of common law questions, namely those affecting the na-
tion as a whole, should be decided by federal courts.120 This tension was 
on display in two U.S. Supreme Court cases in the 1870’s: the 1871 case 
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of Caperton v. Bowyer121 and the 1875 case of New York Life Insurance 
Co. v. Hendren.122 Both cases were more concerned with whether claims 
involving the law of nations provided for federal question jurisdiction 
rather than the development of federal common law per se in situations 
where the federal courts otherwise had jurisdiction.123 
However, these cases provided the Court an opportunity, in the context 
of the law of nations as jurisdiction-creating,124 to hear debate about 
whether the law of nations was “law of the United States.”125 The Court 
also addressed the issues of whether the common law of the United 
States exists separate from general common law and whether it includes 
the law of nations.126 In Caperton, the Supreme Court was asked to de-
cide whether international law, and in particular the law of war, was in-
cluded in “laws of the United States” and, thus, presented a federal ques-
tion for purposes of the Court’s appellate review.127 Although the Court 
ultimately refrained from deciding the issue,128 both parties presented 
strong views. The defendant, a confederate provost-marshal sued in tort 
by a man whom he had thrown into prison during the civil war (Bowyer), 
raised defenses under the law of war.129 He proposed that his defenses 
gave rise to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction because “international law 
is a law of the United States, of the nation, and not of the several 
states.”130 The defendant continued, “[t]his indeed must be the law, or the 
General Government is at the mercy, on a question of foreign relations, 
of the action of a State, or of its courts.”131 
The plaintiff argued that Caperton’s defenses, even if based on interna-
tional law, did not provide the Court with appellate jurisdiction as “laws 
of the United States.”132 He argued that although both federal and state 
                                                                                                             
 121. See Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. 216 (1871). 
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courts “recognize the law of nations as binding upon them . . . the law of 
nations is not embodied in any provision of the Constitution, nor in any 
treaty, act of Congress, or any authority, or commission derived from the 
United States.”133 Notably, the plaintiff conceded that perhaps the Su-
preme Court should have appellate jurisdiction over cases affecting for-
eign relations because this is an area of responsibility for the federal gov-
ernment134—a seeming concession that the development of jurisdiction-
creating federal common law in the area of the law of nations affecting 
foreign relations might be appropriate. However, he argued that this par-
ticular case did not affect foreign relations.135 
In 1875, the Supreme Court directly considered whether a claim in-
volving the law of nations presented a federal question for appellate ju-
risdiction and found that it did not. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 
the Supreme Court considered the effect of the Civil War upon insurance 
contracts.136 The Court held that no federal question was presented where 
the question rested on the general law of nations, unless it was contended 
that the general rules had been “modified or suspended” by the laws of 
the United States.137 The Court treated this question as one of general 
public law available to and applicable in all courts, but not as one creat-
ing a federal question.138 
The opinion drew a vigorous dissent by Justice Bradley, whose opinion 
supported an argument for the development of federal common law in 
the area of international law.139 He stated that “international law has the 
force of law in our courts, because it is adopted and used by the United 
States.”140 According to Justice Bradley: 
[T]he laws which the citizens of the United States are to obey in regard 
to intercourse with a nation or people with which they are at war are 
laws of the United States . . . [whether these laws] be the unwritten in-
ternational law . . . or the express regulations of the government, when 
it sees fit to make them. But in both cases it is the law of the United 
States for the time being, whether written or unwritten.141 
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Justice Bradley also noted the importance of ensuring uniformity and the 
finality of decision by the national government in these types of mat-
ters.142 
Although the majority in Hendren suggested that the law of nations is 
not jurisdiction-creating,143 it did not address whether federal common 
law might exist in the area of foreign affairs. Nor did the Court address 
any issues that could affect foreign affairs. The majority viewed the case 
as wholly domestic.144 Had the case impacted foreign affairs, one may 
wonder if the Court would have reached a different result. 
Both the Caperton and the Hendren decisions demonstrate that wheth-
er the law of nations was included in the newly-developing federal com-
mon law was a live issue at the time Congress enacted federal question 
jurisdiction in 1875.145 The Caperton case had been decided nearly four 
years earlier.146 Hendren was decided in October of 1875,147 just a few 
months after the enactment of § 1331 in March of 1875.148 Although it is 
unclear when the oral argument was heard, certain members of Congress, 
including Senator Carpenter, were probably aware that the issue was pre-
sented before the Court. Senator Carpenter was recognized as one of the 
leading constitutionalists in the nation, having argued several significant 
constitutional cases before the Supreme Court.149 Given this fact, it is 
difficult to believe that he was unaware of the arguments surrounding 
whether the law of nations was federal common law or gave rise to fed-
eral appellate jurisdiction under the “Laws of the Unites States.” 
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Senator Carpenter gave no direct clues, but he indicated a belief that 
federal question jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly whenever uni-
quely federal or national interests were at stake. For example, a review of 
his speeches and writings at the time suggest that he opposed expansion 
of the federal government’s jurisdiction over state-related matters.150 
However, he supported such expansion over the matters that could affect 
national interests, including foreign affairs.151 Thus, it is probable that he 
believed § 1331 should in fact include the developing federal common 
law, including the law of nations when foreign relations issues were in-
volved. This is especially true given the likelihood of his knowledge and 
approval of the developing federal common law in areas of national in-
terests.    
2. Continued Development of Federal Common Law in the Area of In-
ternational Law 
Twenty years later, the courts addressed again the emergence of feder-
al common law in the area of international law in the 1894 federal dis-
trict court case Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry Co.152 Murray concerned 
an action to recover damages for freight transportation rates.153 The court 
held that federal courts are empowered to develop common law prin-
ciples governing “matters of national control.”154 It pointed to interna-
tional law in particular, stating that “[t]he subject-matter of dealing with 
other nations is conferred exclusively upon the national government, and 
of necessity all questions arising under the law of nations . . . are com-
mitted to the national government.”155 In 1901, the Supreme Court cited 
Murray approvingly in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing 
Co.156—a case in which the Court held that it had jurisdiction over 
claims involving pricing, applying emerging federal common law to the 
case. 
The above cases reflect a time in the 1800’s and early 1900’s in which 
federal common law was being developed by the courts. The cases dem-
onstrate a struggle to define the federal courts’ proper jurisdiction and its 
power to create federal common law, especially after the trend toward 
strong federal power after the Civil War. The ultimate conclusion 
reached in 1938 by the Supreme Court in Erie v. Tompkins and its proge-
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ny now seems so obviously simple: in areas of state concern, federal 
courts do not have the authority to develop federal common law.157 Thus, 
it naturally follows that in areas of uniquely federal interests, especially 
as set forth through the division of responsibilities of the Constitution, 
federal courts do have the ability to develop federal common law. 
3. “General Federal Common Law” Came to an End with Erie v. Tomp-
kins, but Enclaves Remain. 
The 1938 Supreme Court decision of Erie v. Tompkins158 ended the 
expansion of general federal common law. In Erie, the U.S. Supreme 
Court declared that federal general common law no longer exists, and, in 
diversity cases, federal courts should apply state law except in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or acts of Congress.159 Erie insi-
nuated, however, that enclaves of federal common law still exist by stat-
ing that judicial action is permissible in matters the Constitution specifi-
cally authorized or delegated to the United States.160 
Moreover, on the same day that the Court issued the Erie decision, it 
also issued another decision written by the same author, Justice Brandeis. 
The decision, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co, 
states that the question of “whether the water of an interstate stream must 
be apportioned between the two States is a question of ‘federal common 
law,’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can 
be conclusive.”161 Hinderlider recognized that, notwithstanding the Erie 
ruling, federal common law continues to exist in certain important 
areas.162 The Court acknowledged that prior Court decisions regarding 
whether controversies involving interstate boundaries, waterways, and 
compacts created a federal question were not uniform,163 but ultimately 
found that such controversies were “federal common law” and should 
create a federal question.164 In fact, as discussed below, this may be one 
of the very first cases that specifically lead to the notion that “federal 
common law” presents a federal question for jurisdictional purposes. 
The Hinderlider decision confirmed what had been developing for 
some time: in matters affecting uniquely federal interests, federal courts 
can develop and apply their own common law—federal common law. It 
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since has been accepted that international law is one such area of federal 
common law. 
4. Courts Recognize Aspects of the Law of Nations as an Enclave of 
Federal Common Law that Survived Erie. 
Shortly after the Erie decision, Professor Philip Jessup wrote a well-
known law review article in which he argued that customary internation-
al law should be treated as federal common law.165 He stated: 
Any question of applying international law in our courts involves the 
foreign relations of the United States and can thus be brought within a 
federal power. . . . 
. . . . 
It would be unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our 
ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of international law.166 
This prediction came to fruition in the 1964 case Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino.167 In Sabbatino, the Court applied the Act of State 
Doctrine—an international law rule—as a matter of federal common law 
when it dismissed a claim by an American commodity broker against 
Cuba for title to sugar.168 The Court recognized that it had the authority 
to develop a common law rule because the doctrine is so important to 
foreign relations.169 In so doing, the Court notes that the “United States 
courts apply international law as part of our own in appropriate circums-
tances . . . .”170 The decision further states: 
We are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic 
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the 
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of 
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of 
federal law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules 
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like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins.171 
It also notes, with approval, Professor Jessup’s proposition that rules of 
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial 
state interpretations, and that “[h]is basic rationale is equally applicable 
to the act of state doctrine.”172 The Sabbatino case is especially important 
to the consideration of the issues addressed in this Article. There, the 
Court did not directly apply international law or the law of nations, but 
rather believed that it had the authority to develop federal common law 
where a case might impact foreign affairs.173 In exercising this authority, 
it explored international law and recognized a customary international 
law rule in the development of federal common law.174 
Similarly, in the 1981 case of Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Mate-
rials, Inc., the Supreme Court confirmed that “international disputes im-
plicating . . . our relations with foreign nations” is an area of law that 
continues to exist as an enclave of federal common law.175 According to 
the Court in Texas Industries, courts can create federal common law ei-
ther where there is specific Congressional authorization to do so or 
where it is “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,” such as those 
areas “concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States” 
including “our relations with foreign nations.”176 The Court continues: 
In these instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy 
to be resolved under state law, either because the authority and duties 
of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because the 
interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it inappro-
priate for state law to control.177 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa agreed that federal courts have the au-
thority to create federal common law in certain areas.178 The Court rec-
ognized that Erie allows “limited enclaves” in which federal courts may 
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derive some substantive federal common law.179 The Sosa Court indi-
cated that the law of nations or areas of federal relations is one such 
area.180 
The cases discussed in this Part, including Jecker, The Paquette Haba-
na, Hinderlider, Sabbatino, Texas Industries, and Sosa, all suggest that 
federal courts have the authority to develop law in areas of uniquely fed-
eral interests, such as in cases affecting foreign relations. Further, the 
cases suggest courts may look to customary international law and incor-
porate it into federal common law when appropriate. This is true whether 
a court is recognizing a private claim for violations of federal common 
law, as Court’s decision in Sosa indicates is within federal court’s power, 
or applying a rule of decision in diversity cases where a judicial opinion 
may impact foreign affairs. 
A close analysis of these cases also leads to the conclusion that the law 
of nations per se is not part of the “laws of the United States,” and cus-
tomary international law is not wholly incorporated into our federal 
common law.181 Instead, when uniquely federal interests are involved, 
the federal courts have common law authority to adopt certain rules of 
customary international law, which in turn become federal common law.   
D. Federal Common Law is Now Considered “Law of the United States” 
for Purposes of Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
If federal common law did not exist at the time when the Constitution 
was written, and was only coming into existence during the enactment of 
general federal question jurisdiction in 1875, the ensuing question is 
whether the “Laws of the United States” for Article III purposes include 
modern federal common law, which in turn incorporates some aspects of 
customary international law. A similar question is whether, given that 
Congress in 1875 probably intended to confer jurisdiction to federal 
courts through the enactment of federal question jurisdiction as expan-
sively as allowed by Article III,182 arising under “laws of the United 
States” for purposes of § 1331 includes federal common law that incor-
porates, or recognizes, aspects of customary international law. 
The Supreme Court has never clearly stated that federal common law 
can be the basis of “Laws of the United States” under Article III. How-
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ever, the Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois did clearly state that federal 
common law could be the basis for § 1331 jurisdiction.183 Some com-
mentators argue that Milwaukee v. Illinois, as well as two dissenting opi-
nions in other cases written by Justice Brennan, lead to the logical con-
clusion that Article III’s “Laws of the United States” includes federal 
common law.184 The fact that the Court has accepted that § 1331 jurisdic-
tion is more narrow than the jurisdiction provided for in Article III185 
strengthens this view. Thus, if federal common law can provide jurisdic-
tion pursuant to § 1331, it necessarily means that it provides for jurisdic-
tion under Article III as well. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Erie found that the term “laws of 
the several states” found in § 34 of the First Judiciary Act (also known as 
the Rules of Decision Act)186 included state common law when deciding 
what rules of decision should apply in diversity cases.187 As such, it fol-
lows that “laws of the United States” in both, Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 should also include common law of the United States, i.e., federal 
common law. 
Although the Supreme Court in Sosa did not address whether claims 
for violation of the law of nations under the ATS “arise under the Consti-
tution or Laws of the United States” for Article III purposes, its decision 
indicates the Court’s belief that such claims arise under Article III’s 
“Laws of the United States” as federal common law. But because this 
issue was not raised or briefed by the parties, the Court did not have an 
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occasion to consider it directly. As noted in Part I,188 when an ATS case 
is between an alien and a citizen, Article III’s alienage provision pro-
vides for clear Article III constitutionality.189 But when the case is be-
tween two aliens, as it was in Sosa, federal courts can exercise jurisdic-
tion pursuant the ATS under Article III only if the claims meet the “aris-
ing under this Constitution, Laws of the United States” provision.190 It 
appears that the Court assumed that the ATS was constitutional under 
Article III, even when the case involves an alien bringing suit against 
another alien. This is due, in part, to the Sosa Court’s silence on this is-
sue and its affirmation that federal courts have the power to recognize 
certain tort claims for violation of the law of nations. Moreover, the Su-
preme Court did not challenge the holding in the ground-breaking 1980 
ATS case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, which stated that the ATS was consti-
tutional based on the “Laws of the United States” provision of Article 
III.191 Moreover, the Court cited Filartiga approvingly in other con-
texts.192 This silence with respect to the ATS’s constitutionality, coupled 
with the Court’s approval of Filartiga and its statement that “[f]or two 
centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States 
recognizes the law of nations,”193 creates a fair assumption that the Su-
preme Court most likely agrees that the ATS is constitutional as between 
two aliens under Article III’s “arising under the Laws of the United 
States” provision as federal common law. 
Finally, as analyzed above,194 federal courts have the authority to de-
velop federal common law in areas of unique federal interest, given the 
ordering of the Constitution’s division of powers. The Constitutional di-
visions of responsibility between federal and state government arguably 
provide for this implicit authorization. Where such implicit constitutional 
division of issues occurs (e.g., in areas of foreign affairs), federal courts 
should have the ability, when appropriate, to develop federal common 
law in those areas of federal responsibility. Where such occurs, federal 
common law should be considered law of the United States for purposes 
of Article III and § 1331. 
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III. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §1331, FEDERAL COURTS HAVE THE 
AUTHORITY TO USE THEIR COMMON LAW POWER TO PROVIDE 
REMEDIES BY RECOGNIZING PRIVATE CLAIMS FOR CERTAIN 
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS. 
A. Congress Understood When it Enacted 28 U.S.C. §1331 that Federal 
Courts Would Use Their Common Law Power to Recognize Certain 
Common Law Claims. 
To the degree that common law claims alleging a violation of customa-
ry international law arise under the laws of the United States for purposes 
of general federal question jurisdiction, federal courts can, and should, 
have the common law power to provide remedies by recognizing such 
private claims, even absent explicit statutory authorization. Although 
related to the question of whether claims involving the law of nations 
arise under the laws of the United States as federal common law, the 
courts’ authorization to invoke their common law powers to provide a 
remedy through recognition of the claim for such violations is a different 
issue. Generally, there is a consensus that some type of authorization is 
necessary for a federal court to provide a remedy for a violation of law 
through the recognition of a private cause of action.195 The issue is 
whether the authorization needs to be explicit, such as a statute, as some 
scholars suggest,196 or whether it can be implicit in light of Congression-
al intent, Congressional understanding, or the Constitution’s division of 
responsibilities.197 
In Sosa, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the ATS was a juris-
dictional statute that did not itself create a cause of action, but held that 
federal courts, through their common law power, could provide remedies 
by recognizing aliens’ private claims for a limited set of violations of the 
law of nations198 as a matter of federal common law.199 In other words, 
the Court found that a private cause of action exists for certain interna-
tional law violations but federal common law provides the claim in cases 
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brought under the ATS.200 The Court found that Congress had implicitly 
authorized the federal courts to use their common law powers to recog-
nize these private claims because when Congress enacted the ATS in 
1789, it did so with an understanding “that courts would exercise juris-
diction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of 
nations.”201 
The analysis employed by the Sosa Court is consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s prior holdings recognizing private causes of action where 
the Court could ascertain that such was Congress’ intent, either expressly 
or by implication.202 In addition, there have been occasions when the 
Court has recognized causes of action where it found that Congress as-
sumed such remedies were available, or where the Court found an im-
plied action existed because such private claims had been allowed pre-
viously.203 Although these occasions involved Congressional assump-
tions in enacting statutes, there is no reason the same analysis should not 
apply to common law claims. In fact, the analysis should be more appli-
cable to claims arising from the common law. In those decisions where 
the courts found private claims to implicitly arise from the statutes, Con-
gress had the opportunity when it drafted such statutes to create causes of 
action, but did not do so. With federal common law, Congress has had no 
similar opportunity. 
The analysis regarding implicit authorization employed by the Sosa 
Court should also apply to § 1331, because it is a jurisdictional statute 
just like the ATS. Thus, the question of whether federal courts are autho-
rized to recognize causes of action for common law claims brought under 
§ 1331 should be whether Congress understood when it enacted the sta-
tute in 1875 that federal courts would use their common law power to 
recognize claims for common law tort violations. 
Congress likely understood that federal courts would do so. As with 
the ATS, when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it likely understood 
that federal courts would use their common law power to recognize tort 
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claims, including claims for violations of the law of nations where those 
claims implicated foreign relations.204 In fact, federal courts had been 
recognizing private, common law tort claims for nearly 100 years.205 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Sosa, “torts in violation of the 
law of nations were recognized as part of the common law” even in the 
late 1700’s.206 Federal courts recognized private claims for violations of 
the law of nations in the late 1700’s,207 and in 1875, those cases were still 
good law. The Sosa Court cited two of these cases to support its position 
that Congress assumed that private claims alleging violations of the law 
of nations could be brought as part of the common law.208 
A review of cases decided in the1800’s demonstrates that during this 
time, federal courts recognized private claims for violations of common 
law generally, and law of nations specifically, without statutory authori-
zation. The most common type of federal cases where private claims for 
violations of the laws of nations were recognized as a matter of common 
law was in the area of prize,209 over which the courts had jurisdiction in 
admiralty. Such cases included the 1855 case of Jecker v. Montgomery, 
where the Supreme Court entertained a private, common law claim,210 as 
well as the 1862 Prize Cases, where the Supreme Court entertained four 
common law private claims in which the plaintiffs alleged that their 
ships’ capture and seizure as prize was unlawful.211 
Other instances where federal courts recognized private claims for torts 
as a matter of common law occurred in cases against military officers 
and against civilians who were obeying the orders of military officers 
during times of armed conflict. For example, in the 1849 case of Luther 
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v. Borden,212 the Supreme Court ruled that when martial law was im-
posed in Rhode Island after an insurgent uprising to overthrow the gov-
ernment, an officer could be held civilly accountable for acts willfully 
done to an individual with more force than militarily necessary.213 No 
specific authorization for a private claim was cited, rather, such appears 
to have been a matter of common law. 
In the 1851 seminal case of Mitchell v. Harmony,214 a U.S. citizen who 
traded in Mexico during the U.S-Mexican War in an area under U.S. 
control, brought a claim in federal court for the common law torts of 
trespass and conversion215 against an officer in the U.S. Army who had 
seized and converted for his own use the plaintiff’s horses, mules, wa-
gons, goods, chattels, and merchandise.216 After rejecting defendants’ 
arguments that he was justified to act under the law of war,217 the Court 
allowed the private claim to go forward as a common law claim.218 
A review of the above cases, among others,219 demonstrates that feder-
al courts routinely recognized private claims, including claims for viola-
tions of the law of nations, without the need for any specific authoriza-
tion during the era when Congress enacted federal question jurisdiction. 
It was assumed that the federal courts could use their common law power 
to recognize private, civil claims. Thus, when Congress enacted § 1331 
in 1875, it understood that federal courts would use their common law 
powers to recognize private claims once they had jurisdiction over such 
claims. As argued above, Congress also likely understood that § 1331 
would create jurisdiction over the newly-developing federal common law 
claims—i.e., those common law claims affecting uniquely federal inter-
ests, including those invoking the laws of nations which could affect for-
eign relations. 
B. Response to the Sosa Court’s Skepticism Regarding § 1331 
In response to Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion that the Court’s de-
cision in Sosa would lead to federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 
for claims of customary international law violations, 220the Court stated, 
“[o]ur position does not . . . imply that every grant of jurisdiction to a 
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federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop common law (so 
that the grant of federal-question jurisdiction would be equally as good 
for our purposes of § 1350).”221 Moreover, although the Court confirmed 
that “no development in the last two centuries has precluded federal 
courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element 
of common law,”222 it stated that its opinion regarding the ATS was con-
sistent with the division of responsibilities between federal and state 
courts after Erie,223 but that the same might not be true for “a more ex-
pansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”224 
The Court’s skepticism regarding whether customary international law 
claims fall under § 1331’s jurisdiction likely relates to concerns about 
federal courts using their common law powers too broadly, recognizing 
claims in a vast array of areas unrelated to uniquely federal interests, or 
for actions Congress may never have intended or understood when it 
enacted § 1331. Such use of federal common law powers would likely 
not be consistent with Erie. However, use of common law power is con-
sistent with Erie if federal courts only use their common law powers to 
recognize and provide remedies for those claims of customary interna-
tional law violations that entail uniquely federal interests, such as foreign 
relations. 
Erie ultimately was about the tension between federal and state power. 
It contemplated and overturned the federal courts’ usurpation of state 
judicial power in matters of local (not federal) concern.225 But the Erie 
decision did not address whether federal courts could use their federal 
common law power to recognize claims in areas of clearly national inter-
est. In fact, the Erie decision allows for certain enclaves of federal com-
mon law. 
Federal courts can and should be able to use their common law power 
to recognize claims for violation of the law of nations where the recogni-
tion of such claims may affect foreign relations. Such claims should fall 
within the jurisdiction of federal courts, even where the claim is brought 
by a U.S. citizen, given that such claims might impact foreign affairs ei-
ther through the recognition of the claim, a finding that the claim is non-
justiciable, or through definitions of customary international law. Erie is 
not to the contrary. 
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CONCLUSION 
Claims alleging violations of customary international law that have the 
potential to impact foreign affairs or other national interests should fall 
within the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as federal common 
law claims, which arise under the “laws of the United States.” Similarly, 
such claims arise under the “Laws of the United States” for purposes of 
Article III, and thus, their justiciability is constitutional. Federal courts 
should also have the common law power to recognize and provide reme-
dies for these claims, because Congress understood, when it enacted § 
1331 in 1875, that federal courts would use their common law power to 
recognize newly-emerging federal common law claims, just as both fed-
eral and state courts routinely recognized common law tort claims. As 
long as this federal common law power is used to develop and recognize 
claims that affect uniquely federal interests, such as foreign affairs, and 
not claims affecting primarily state interests, this power is consistent 
with Erie v. Tompkins and its progeny. 
